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With the aid of an analytical framework of the Lewis model revised to reflect the 
experience of China, this paper examines the country’s dualistic economic development 
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exploitation of the demographic dividend, the realization of comparative advantage, the 
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1 Introduction 
The discussion and understanding of the stages of development have long been the 
tradition of development economics and are considered to be the key in exploring the 
diversity among countries in terms of economic achievements. It is generally believed 
by economists that some countries were able to accomplish rapid economic growth and 
move out of poverty, because they successfully advanced through the inevitable stages 
of economic development, while other countries performed badly and remained trapped 
as underdeveloped, because they stagnated at an earlier stage of development. 
Therefore, despite of existence of competing theories and policy advocacies on the 
stages of development (for example, see Rostow 1963), economists are continually 
trying to contribute to the classification of development stages and to apply it to their 
own theoretical models and for advising policymakers (see Sachs 2004). The pioneer in 
the attempt to categorize the stages of development for all economies in the entire 
development history is Rostow (1960). According to his classification, the development 
stages of all countries can be divided into five categories: (i) the traditional society;  
(ii) the preconditions for takeoff, (iii) the takeoff, (iv) the drive to maturity, and (v) the 
age of mass consumption. A more recent classification of development stages and 
application to today’s phenomena of distinct economic performances among developing 
countries is given by Sachs (2004). According to Sachs, the development process from 
poverty to wealth is divided into the commercial stage, the industrial stage, and the 
knowledge-based stage, and each phase poses different challenges for economic policy 
and strategy. 
However, Rostow’s classification criterion does not clearly explore the factors believed 
by mainstream economics to be vital to economic growth, nor does Sachs consistently 
follow the criterion throughout all the stages he classifies. Lewis’s categorization of two 
sectors offers a better theory of what triggers economic growth at the dual economy 
stage or at modern growth stage (Lewis 1954). Lewis, in examining developing 
economies, rejected the neoclassical assumption of limited labour supply and divided a 
typical developing economy into two sectors: the capitalist sector and the traditional 
sector.1 In the traditional sector, population size is large compared to capital and natural 
resources, and thus the supply of labour is unlimited. In other words, the sector’s 
marginal productivity of labour is very low. Existence of the traditional sector enables 
the modern economic sector, as it expands, to obtain the necessary labour force at 
constant wage rates. Thus, in the dualistic economic development model, the only 
constraint to economic growth is the capability of capital accumulation. As expressed 
by Lewis (1954) and Rostow (1960), in the modern economic sector the key for 
economic growth is to persistently maintain a critical minimum level of savings rate. 
According to the Lewis model, therefore, a dual economy exemplifies the typical 
economic development of developing countries. On the one hand, there is an endless 
supply of labour from the traditional sector to the modern economic sector at a constant 
wage rate, and on the other, continuous expansion of the modern economic sector 
                                                 
1   In his paper, Lewis points out that the traditional sector is not confined only to indicate the 
agricultural sector, but is also applied to all sectors with the characteristics of income sharing, whereas 
the capitalism sector is mainly referred to the sector whose wage is determined in accordance with 
marginal productivity of labour. Kuznets (1973) distinguishes between the agricultural sector and 
modern economic growth according to six characteristics of the latter. Since we are trying to include 
all merits of this distinction, this paper will thereafter use the terminology: traditional sector and 
modern economic sector.   2
fuelled by capital accumulation. The dual economy does not begin to integrate into 
homogeneous one until the modern economic sector has absorbed all surplus labour in 
the traditional sector. In the sense, the point in time when the long-existing surplus 
labour is exhausted is called the Lewisian turning point, and its arrival is essentially the 
result of successful economic growth. The Lewis model, therefore, provides not only a 
useful classification of the stages of economic growth, but also suggests a way to 
transform a traditional economy into modern growth. However, to apply the Lewis 
model to the analysis of a specific economy, we should combine the advantages of each 
of the earlier methods to avoid irrelevance, inconsistency or oversimplification. 
In this paper, we refer economic stages to regimes under which the resilient features 
with respect to the sources of growth exemplify the expansion. As is shown in Figure 1, 
whether comparing countries at different stages of development—from a cross-country 
perspective, or between stages of development within a country—economic growth 
from a timeseries perspective usually goes through natural resources-based, physical 
capital-based, (for some countries) labour force-based and total factor productivity-
based stages, respectively and ordinally. Accordingly, the transformation from one 
source-based growth phase to another involves a fundamental transformation of the 
growth patterns. In general, two or three such transformations are required for a country 
to shift from poverty to wealth, and each of the transformations provides the country 
with a new source of growth, which in turn sustains its economic growth during the 
entire span of the subsequent stage. This classification of growth stages not only 
consists within the Lewis model but also enriches it by indicating more specifically the 
sources on which each of the growth stage is based. 
Figure 1  
Source of growth, transformations, and development stages 
 
Source:  Drawn by the author.     3
The formulation of a directive and relevant policy orientation for the economic 
development of a country entails adequate understanding of the generalized rule of 
development process. That is, it is essential for policymakers and scholarly policy 
advocates to accurately judge the development stages, fully explore the elements of 
development at various stages, and to be able in particular to identify the characteristics 
relevant at the turning point between two stages. A range of characteristics apparent in 
the Chinese economy indicate that the economy, as it continues to move through a cycle 
of macroeconomic fluctuation, has been gradually phasing toward a new stage since the 
new century. This phased change will have its logical consequences. First of all, after 
the significantly positive impact of the unique success of the Chinese demographic 
transition on the economy, the period of inputs-based fast growth is coming to an end. 
Second, the emerging labour shortage, while extinguishing the long-term source of 
economic growth, may change the political economy climate under which the persistent 
policy orientation of favouring urban areas over rural areas, and accelerate labour 
market integration. Since this change is a double-edged weapon—that is, it will serve 
either to lift the economy in China to new heights, or plunge it into an equilibrium trap, 
it is vitally important to have full understanding of this forthcoming developmental 
stage in order to take advantage of its positive elements. This paper tries to justify and 
supplement the Lewisian dual economy model with China’s experience in economic 
growth and to develop an analytical framework under which the development of a dual 
economy and its unique characteristics can be explained, and the implications of the 
changes to institutional innovation and sustainability of growth can be highlighted. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the development of 
China’s dual economy by adding country-specific factors to the classical dual-economy 
development model. This section mainly outlines (i) how China’s economic growth has 
exploited the demographic dividend; (ii) to what extent the improvement in productivity 
has played a role in driving the country’s rapid growth, and (iii) how globalization has 
provided a window of opportunity for China to leverage on its comparative advantage in 
labour-intensive industries. Section 3 reviews first the implications of the Lewisian 
turning point on economic development, focusing mainly on the role of demographic 
transition and labour market integration during the turning period in development. It 
then highlights changes in the development stage and various aspects of the approaching 
turning point in the Chinese economy. Section 4 points out the major features of the 
institutional innovation faced by China in its attempts to sustain economic growth. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2  The Chinese style development of a dual economy  
Economic development in China—characterized by a huge reservoir of surplus 
agricultural labour, institutional segmentation of the labour market between rural and 
urban sectors, and thus low and long-deflated wages of rural-to-urban migrant 
workers—can be considered to represent a Lewisian-type of dual economy 
development. Compared to the Lewis model, however, the development of China’s dual 
economy has distinct features that reflect the central planning system that accompanied 
it during both the pre-reform period and the economic transition in the reform period. 
During the planning period, despite surpluses in the agricultural labour force, the 
institutional trinity of state monopoly on agricultural products, the commune system, 
and household registration (hukou) system prevented rural workers from migrating to   4
urban sectors. The resulting inefficiency of resource allocation, compounded by a 
defective incentive mechanism and technical inefficiency in management, led to 
economic growth without increased productivity. In the entire pre-reform period, the 
contribution of TFP to economic growth was zero (Perkins 2005). Economic reform and 
the open-door policy have driven an unprecedented growth of GDP of nearly 10 per 
cent per annum between 1978 and 2005. During the overall course of reform and 
openness, economic growth has been characterized by the development of the dual 
economy. In what follows, we examine the development of dualistic economy, Chinese 
style, by investigating the effects of reform and the policy of opening-up on economic 
growth. 
2.1 Demographic  dividend 
During transition, Chinese economic growth has taken full advantage of the 
demographic dividend. During the entire reform period since the late 1970s, both the 
number and proportion of the working-aged population have continually increased, with 
the population dependence ratio declining correspondingly. This has guaranteed an 
adequate supply of labour and helped to achieve high savings (Figure 2). Thanks to a 
reform of the resource-allocation mechanism, this potential demographic dividend has 
translated into a comparative advantage once China became integrated into the global 
economy, and thus deferred diminishing returns-to-capital by fuelling economic growth 
from an extra source. Taking total dependence ratio as a proxy for the advantageous 
population structure, during the period 1982-2000, each 1 per cent decrease in this ratio 
led to a per capita GDP growth of  0.115 per cent; that is, the declining total dependence 
rate accounted for more than one-quarter of the per capita GDP growth in the reform 
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Source:  Cai and Wang (2005). 
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Table 1 
Income earned in the rural-to-urban labour migration  
 
No. of migrants 
(million) 
(1) 





Wage share of rural 
households’ income (%)
1997 38.90  501.6  383.3  24.6 
1998 49.36  636.4  520.2  26.5 
1999 52.04  671.0  586.6  28.5 
2000 61.34  790.9  739.5  31.2 
2001 78.49  1012.1  1012.1  32.6 
2002 83.99  1083.0  1153.4  33.9 
2003 98.31  1267.6  1437.8  35.0 
2004 102.60  1322.9  1598.0  34.0 
Sources: NBS (2005) for the data on wage share in rural households  income; 
  Institute of Population and Labour Economics for the data on the average wages of migrant 
workers (cities surveyed: Shanghai, Shenyang, Wuhan, Fuzhou and Xi’an). 
  Details about the number of migrants are explained in Cai (2006a).   
 
period (Cai and Wang 2005). Full exploitation of the demographic dividend can be 
clearly noted in the mass labour migration from rural to urban areas. This exemplified 
China’s dual-economy development: the demographic dividend provided the labour 
force needed for industrialization, while keeping the costs of labour low. Meanwhile, 
income in the both rural and urban areas increases mainly through employment 
expansion, not rising wage rates. 
As can be seen from Table 1, the number of rural-to-urban migrants has increased 
dramatically over the past years, exceeding the 100 million mark in 2004.2 According to 
two surveys on urban migrant workers conducted in 2001 and 2005,3  the average 
annual wages of rural migrants working in the cities were 12.89 thousand yuan in 2001 
and 16.58 thousand yuan in 2005. With these two figures, we can estimate how the 
wages of migrant workers have changed. First, as suggested by scholars and officials,4 
we assume that there were no increases in migrant wage rates between 1997 and 2004, 
and take the wage rate of our survey in 2001 as a proxy of average wages for each year 
under review. Second, in accordance with actual survey observations in 2001 and 2005, 
we assume that the wage rates have increased over time; thus we take the annual rate of 
wage increase between the two survey years as reference to estimate the average annual 
wages for each year between 1997-2004. Thus, we have two sets of wage rates for the 
period 1997-2004—one indicating constant wage rates and the other moderately 
increased wage rates. When these are multiplied by the numbers of migrants per year, 
we obtain two sets of figures on the total wage income earned by Chinese migrant 
workers (Table 1). As indicated by columns 1 and 2, total income earned by the rural-
                                                 
2  Some surveys show even larger numbers of migrant workers; for example, the figure provided by 
Rural Economic and Social Survey Team (2005) was 118 million in 2004. 
3   Both surveys were conducted by the Institute of Population and Labour Economics, Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, covering five cities in 2001 and 12 cities in 2005. 
4   For example, Li Deshui, the former commissioner of the National Bureau of Statistics believes that 
compared to his father’s generation 20 years ago, the wage level of migrant workers in the Pearl River 
Delta area has not changed even today (People’s Daily Online 2005).   6
to-urban migrant workers in 2004 was 13.23 thousand yuan and 15.98 thousand yuan, 
respectively.5 
2.2  Improvement of productivity 
China’s rapid growth economy has benefited from improvements in total factor 
productivity (TFP) and its increased contribution to overall growth (for example, 
Perkins 2005; Wu 2003). TFP, as the residual of output growth that cannot be explained 
by increases in inputs, is usually generated by improvements in technical efficiency and 
resource-allocative efficiency. The successful reform of the past decades not only 
enhanced technical efficiency by improving incentive mechanisms at the micro 
management level, but also achieved resource-allocative efficiency by developing 
markets of production factors, especially by promoting labour mobility. In their 
decomposition of GDP growth components during 1978-98, Cai and Wang (1999) find 
that labour mobility from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors contributed 21 per cent 
to overall growth, while the unexplained contribution was only 3 per cent. Other 
research also confirms that the development of the labour market constitutes a key part 
of the efficiency improvements gained from the reform. The World Bank (1997) shows 
that labour mobility from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors, which also involved 
labour transfers across regions, has been a significant source of economic growth, and 
accounted for 16 per cent of annual GDP growth during the period. Obviously, the 
improvement of productivity in the Chinese economy has been achieved during the 
course of the development of the dualistic economy, characterized by an unlimited 
labour supply. 
2.3 Global  integration 
Increased integration with the global economy provided China with the opportunity to 
utilize its comparative advantage embodied in labour-intensive products. As estimated 
by Banister (2005) and Roach (2006), the average hourly compensation for Chinese 
manufacturing workers in 2002 was US$0.57, or about 3 per cent of the average hourly 
compensation of similar workers in the United States and in many developed countries; 
even countries considered to be competitors in labour-intensive manufacturing had 
much higher labour costs than China. Over the part quarter century of reform and 
opening-up in China, as the total volume of international global trade has rapidly 
expanded, so has China’s trade volume, but at a much faster rate, increasing from 
slightly over 1 per cent in the early 1980s to more than 6 per cent in 2004. The high, and 
obvious, comparative advantage in labour-intensive commodities in the expansion of 
trade is clearly linked to China’s advantageous population structure (Yue 2001; Batra 
and Khan 2005). 
Worldwide flows of international capital enabled China to utilize the more efficient 
capabilities of resources allocation introduced by outside investors. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) was important for China in bridging the twin gaps of domestic savings 
                                                 
5   In the same period, the proportion of wage income in the total income of rural households has also 
improved. The host of policy measures implemented by the central and local governments to reduce 
the tax burdens of the farmers and to increase farming income had, by 2004, halted the ratio of wage 
income in total household income, but this does not imply declining income from migration.   7
and foreign exchange during the early reform phases. The combined effect of the 
demographic transition and fast economic growth increased domestic savings rate 
rapidly, which gradually improved the degree of capital sufficiency for the Chinese 
economy. The inflow of FDI has not, however, slowed down; rather, it is speeding up 
further. This trend seems to indicate that as the Chinese economy embraces the new 
century, FDI no longer flows into the country to fulfil inadequate capital needs, but to 
capitalize on the resource-allocative capabilities of international investors.6 
3  Approaching the turning point and its characterization 
In mainstream development economics, the development theory of the dual economy 
cannot be applied to analyse early development stages, namely because the developed 
countries of Europe and North America have never experienced dual economy in their 
early years. After a long period of ignoring the successful experience in East Asian 
economies, western economists began to explain the East Asian ‘miracle’ from a 
neoclassical economic standpoint (Skousen 1993; World Bank 1993). Furthermore, the 
Lewisian dualist model has not been widely used for explaining the phenomena of long-
term economic development (Ranis 2004). Consequently, there are only a handful of 
studies that examine the turning point of a country progressing from an unlimited 
supply of labour to a shortage of labour, and what are its implications. However, from 
economics literature and direct observations one can still take note of some markers 
indicating the Lewisian turning point. In what follows, we highlight two of the main 
markers that are related to the causes and consequences of the turning point. 
First, the demographic transition resulting from the decline in birth rates alters the 
labour demand and supply curves. A country’s stagnant transition from a demographic 
pattern of low death rates, high birth and population growth rates to one in which all of 
these rates are low, is the major reason for the traditional sector’s surplus labour and 
unlimited supply of labour. During demographic transition when substantial 
improvements in health and nutrition lead to a dramatic drop in death rates, the decline 
of birth rates usually lags behind, resulting in an increase in population growth rates. 
Because of this interval between declines in the death and birth rates, fertility and 
population growth rates surge in the long term in many developing countries, 
differentiating their development path from the progress followed earlier by the 
developed countries. As economic and social welfare develop further, people gradually 
change their reproductive behaviour, and the demographic transition moves to a phase 
of low death, birth and growth rates. At this stage, the population tends to become aged 
and can no longer support the unlimited supply of labour and the Lewisian turning 
point, as signalled by the exhaustion of surplus labour, is reached within a certain 
period.7 
                                                 
6  It was first suggested by Kalecki (1976: 27) that the difference between highly developed and 
developing non-socialist economies is their different abilities to efficiently utilize resources. Cai 
(2006b) develops this point of view to explain the contradictory coexistence of twin deficits in the 
United States and twin surpluses in China and other developing and transitional economies. 
7   For example, Lewis (1958) anticipated the turning point of the Japanese economy by observing its 
sharp fall in birth rate.   8
Second, the resulting labour shortage facilitates further integration of the labour market. 
The Lewisian dual-economy paradigm is virtually a theoretical reflection of the labour 
market segmentation rather than a mere categorization of two sectors with different 
labour supply characteristics (Fields 2004). Notwithstanding the fact that labour 
migration from the traditional to the modern sector is a marked phenomenon of dual-
economy development process (Todaro 1969), rural and urban labour markets are 
distinct, because unlimited supply of labour, on the one hand, leads to extremely low 
marginal productivity and shared wages in the traditional sector, and on the other, to 
trade union activities and government regulations influencing wage determination in 
urban labour markets.  
Agriculture, as representative of the traditional sector, provides a seemingly endless 
source of labour for the modern economic sector that absorbs the surplus at a constant 
wage rate. Therefore, under a dual economy, wage rates persist at a subsistence level 
until the expanding modern sector has exhausted the surplus. As a consequence of the 
emerging shortage, competing for the labour force inevitably leads to increased wages 
in the modern sector. This, in turn, affects agriculture, and the relationship between 
wage rates and agricultural productivity becomes close to what economics would 
expect. A noticeable fact is that the shift from a fragmented to an integrated labour 
market also begins with a wage increase in agriculture relative to other sectors (see 
Watanabe 1994). 
In addition to the supportive institutional climate created by economic reform, the 
successful demographic transition—facilitated by social and economic developments 
and the implementation of family-planning—also provided an important contribution to 
the rapid expansion of China’s economy. As a rule, the process of demographic 
transition is characterized by a time differential. That is, as declining rates of birth and 
mortality advance through the three phases, these introduce changes in the population 
age structure that shifts, first, from a high dependence ratio of children to a high 
proportion of the working population and finally to a high dependence ratio of the aged 
(Williamson 1997). During the earlier period between the reduction in death rates and 
the lag in declining birth rates, the natural population growth rate persistently climbs up 
and the share of dependent youth in the total population increases accordingly. As 
fertility rates begin to drop, the share of working aged population increases with a lag of 
about twenty years. A further drop in fertility rates will lead to slower population 
growth and people beginning to become aged. Therefore, two sequential inversely   
U-shaped curves for the natural population growth rates and for working aged-
population growth rates, respectively, can be expected when one tries to outline the 
demographic transition with a timeseries. 
Utilizing historical data and predicted outcomes, we can delineate a picture of China’s 
demographic transition. As Figure 3 shows, the continuous fall in natural population 
growth rates began in the mid-1960s, and was followed by a drop in the growth rate of 
the working aged population two decades later. The growth rate of working aged 
population has further declined since the beginning of this century, and is expected to be 
zero by late 2010. Given that this population groups represents the bottom line of the 
ultimate labour supply, these changes in population patterns imply that after the long-
term development of the dual economy, the benefit of an unlimited labour supply is 
vanishing; namely, the Lewisian turning point is affecting the Chinese economy.  
   9
Figure 3 


























































































Trend of natural growth rate of population
Trend of working population growth rate
 
Note:   the figure is drawn in a multinomial term. 
Source:   NBS various issues; United Nations (2005). 
A shortage of migrant workers was evident in the Pearl River Delta region as early as in 
2003, and the phenomenon has spread to the Yangtze River Delta region, and even to 
provinces in central China, the origin of many migrant labourers. The analysis of the 
population age structure addressed here suggests that the causes of labour shortages are 
demographic in nature and will, therefore, intensify over time. In addition, a moderate 
fall in unemployment rates, increasing labour force participation rates in urban markets, 
and improvements in migrant wages are indicative of the changed labour supply 
conditions (Cai and Wang 2006 and Cai 2007). 
Based on the already diminishing net growth of the working aged population and 
projections of a constantly increasing demand for workers in the non-agricultural 
sectors during the 11th Five-year Plan period (2006-10), a possible gap between the 
labour supply and demand is expected to develop in the very near future. It is assumed 
that agriculture will have no further demand for workers; therefore, the incremental 
value of the working aged population is a reasonable labour supply base for non-
agricultural sectors. Using three alternatives for the non-agricultural growth rate8 and 
two employment elasticities for output growth of non-agricultural sectors,9 we predicted 
six labour demand scenarios to reflect non-agricultural growth. Comparing these with 
the labour supply (incremental working age population), we find that from 2004 on, the 
                                                 
8   Ten per cent for high growth; 9 per cent for medium growth, and 8 per cent for low growth. 
9  One percentage point increase in growth induces a 0.297 percentage point rise in employment (the 
average level during 1991-2003] to represent high elasticity and 1 percentage point increase in growth 
creates a 0.230 percentage point rise in employment (a half standard deviation lower than the average) 
as low elasticity.   10
net increase of new entrants to the labour market tends to lag behind the various labour-
demand projections, and that the gap widens over time. The earliest scene will occur in 
2004 and the latest in 2009 (see Cai and Wang 2006 for details).  
4  Institutional innovation and sustainability of growth 
As discussed above, not only is the Lewisian turning point a theoretical expression of a 
point-in-time when the unlimited supply of labour in the developing countries vanishes, 
but it also has meaningful implications for economic development. For a long time, 
China has been affected by the dualistic economic development process with the typical 
characteristic of an unlimited labour supply. In other words, policymaking and 
institutional arrangements by the government, the choice of industrial organization and 
technology by enterprises and the configuration of industrial structure of the economy 
as a whole have all been influenced by this long-standing diagnostic characteristic. 
Once the Lewisian turning point is reached and unlimited labour supply no longer a 
factor of production, the government, enterprises, workers and consumers will be faced 
unfamiliar options. How China will be able to sustain its economic growth and complete 
its transition to a market-based economy in these new circumstances will depend on 
institutional innovation that conforms to the changes. Next, we discuss the challenges 
facing the country and the institutional adjustment needed once the turning point is 
actually reached. 
First, the impending turning point will need to trigger a transformation of the economic 
growth patterns in order to sustain  the continuing source of growth. The neoclassical 
growth theory asserts that in the face of a limited supply of labour and subsequent 
diminishing returns-to-capital, economic growth can be sustained only by elevating TFP 
and increasing its contribution to growth (Solow 1956). This doctrine is confirmed by 
the development experience of Soviet Union, which ultimately was unable to maintain 
its economic growth based on inputs of capital and labour without TFP advancement. 
Following the same logic, western economists doubted the sustainability of the East 
Asian economic miracle, as reflected in the fast-growth experiences of the four tigers 
(for example, Young 1992 and Krugman 1994). However, at that time, economists 
overlooked the successful demographic transition in these economies. In the absence of 
other critical constraints, the adequate labour supply created through the successfully 
concluded demographic transition generated an extra source of growth for these 
economies and postponed the reduction in returns to capital. This demographic dividend 
and its contribution to the East Asian miracle have been examined by some economists 
(Williamson 1997). Once these countries reached the Lewisian turning point, the rate of 
TFP accelerated and its contribution to growth expanded (Bhagwati 1996), promoting 
the transformation from inputs-based growth pattern to productivity-based one. 
Following a short rise in TFP and its contribution to growth during the early phases of 
reform, China’s performance since the 1990s has been dissatisfactory. According to 
Zheng and Hu (2004), the annual TFP growth rate has declined from 4.63 per cent 
between 1979 and 1995 to 0.60 per cent between 1996-2001. The study by Kuiijs and 
Wang (2005) finds a diminishing TFP contribution to the overall labour productivity 
increase in China. While over a half of the 7.0 per cent increase in labour productivity 
was attributed to TFP improvement during the period 1978-93, only one-third of the 7.8 
per cent labour productivity increase during 1993-2004 was attributed to the improved 
TFP. An improvement in the capital-labour ratio accounted for the rest of the   11
contribution to the increased labour productivity. Similarly to the experiences of the 
East Asian economies, the existing demographic dividend in China generated a distinct 
advantage with regard to quantity, quality and cost of labour that helped the economy to 
maintain a high savings rate for capital investment, and supported the economy with an 
unprecedented growth rate based on inputs of capital and labour, but not by 
productivity.10 However, as the Lewisian turning point is reached, changes in the 
conditions on which such a growth pattern is based become inevitable, and the 
transformation from an inputs-based growth pattern to a TFP-based one becomes more 
urgent.  
Second, the approaching turning point necessitates a change in the pattern of income 
distribution. Kuznets (1955) finds an inverse U-shaped curve in the relationship 
between economic development and income distribution. Despite numerous examples to 
the contrary from empirical research, income distribution does change over time 
according to a certain rule, which, in many cases, is related to the level of economic 
development. The Kuznets-style turning point dividing the two periods—income 
inequality rising in the first and falling in the second—has a certain logical link to the 
Lewisian turning point now that both characterize outstanding stages in economic 
development. Theoretically, as the unlimited supply of labour is exhausted and the 
labour market becomes more integrated into the economy, the demand for unskilled 
labourers intensifies, giving rise to increased wage rates for these workers. Since the 
majority of low-income earners consist of the unskilled and their dependents, this rise in 
wage rates subsequently increases their income relative to other groups. As a result, the 
level of income inequality in the society as a whole is moderated (Freeman 1993; Fields 
2004). Empirically, Kuznets (1955) observed that beginning in the 1920s, the income 
share of low-income group improved, leading to a reduction in income inequality in the 
major developed countries of the west. 
During the early stages of economic development with immature market mechanisms, 
capital is a scarce factor of production while labour is comparatively abundant factor of 
production, and the difference between returns to capital and to labour is large, making 
income distribution favourable for capital owners and unfavourable for holders of 
labour. The overall state of income distribution in a society is usually shaped by the 
dominant component of factor returns. Generally, income from capital has a greater 
effect on overall income inequality than labour income. The larger the share of capital 
earnings in total income, the larger the overall income inequality of the society. But, in 
contrast, the greater share of wage income in total income tends to reduce income 
inequality. Once the unlimited labour supply is exhausted, it is generally followed by a 
decline in capital scarcity. Thus, fuller employment in a society tends to expand the 
share of wages and to reduce the share of capital earnings in total income, leading to a 
more equitable income distribution. This does not happen spontaneously, however, and 
depends on whether the society can create a climate conducive to full employment, as 
required by the new development stage.  
                                                 
10  It is worth recalling is that since the latter part of the 1990s, the growth of China’s heavy industry has 
resumed its runaway pace, which was characteristic of the traditional development strategy during the 
controlled economy. This trend of industrial structure change is motivated by local governments’ push 
for GDP growth and distortion of production factors prices, causing the increase in capital-labour ratio 
(Cai 2006c).   12
Third, the approaching turning point poses challenges that require institutional 
innovations. Experience and economic development lessons indicate that social and 
economic policies as well as institutional arrangements, in which the government has an 
important role, impact directly on the results of income distribution among groups 
(Krugman 2006). On the other hand, policies and institutional arrangements are the 
product of a specific stage of economic development. Changes in the long-term 
relationship between labour supply and demand entail a transfer of the relative 
bargaining powers among social groups from an employer-dominated regime (the 
paradox of number) to an employee-dominated one (the rule of supply and demand), so 
as to effect changes in the equilibrium of interests.11 These would involve a shift of the 
relative bargaining powers among social groups that influence government policy and 
institutional arrangements, the redirection of resource flows between rural and urban 
sectors, redistribution of income among social groups, reversal of employer-employee 
relationship in the labour market, and so on. 
During the course of China’s dualistic economic development, the modern urban 
economic sectors expanded rapidly and attracted massive migration from the rural areas, 
providing an inexhaustible labour force for the urban sectors at very low cost. Due to 
the unlimited supply of labour, migrant workers it the urban sectors had neither 
collective bargaining power nor influence over wage determination, or the labour 
market policies of the local governments. The rural-to-urban migrants subsequently 
confronted numerous institutional obstacles, including the household registration 
(hukou) system separating the rural and urban labour market. Under the sanction of the 
legitimized  hukou system and its discriminatory measures, local governments often 
exerted pressure against the competition from migrant workers. Policy orientation 
discriminated against migrants in accordance with the fluctuating employment cycle 
within the urban labour market (Cai, Du and Wang 2003). Every time the rural-to-urban 
labour mobility faces systematic government obstruction, migrant workers have no 
choice but to return to their contracted land or family businesses in their home villages, 
forming a cyclical reservoir of rural surplus labour. This Chinese-style wage sharing 
system causes a lack of permanence for the labour migration, instability in off-farm 
income for rural households and persistence of the rural-urban income gap. Only when 
the relationship between labour supply and demand inversely shifts against its long-last 
stance, can the conditions needed to solve these problems mature. In most developed 
countries, systematic labour shortage has become the turning point when employer-
employee relationship started to improve, income inequality tended to decrease, and 
government policies and legislations began to favour ordinary workers. However, 
experience also suggests that if the government is incapable of making sound policy 
options and delays the action needed to cope with the subsequent stage of development, 
the discriminatory measures of the dualistic era will continue, leading to severe working 
class discontentment or even fierce social conflict.12 
                                                 
11  Olson (1985) and Anderson (1995) respectively examine why government policies in poor countries 
(at lower development stages) tend to favour urban residents over farmers, while the reverse seems to 
be the case in rich countries (at higher development levels). These assumptions can well be borrowed 
for analysing employer-employee relationships. 
12  Korea in the late 1980s is an example of a country where the majority of the conditions necessary for 
worker-related institutional changes developed, but no action was taken, resulting in severe conflict 
between the government and the working masses (Freeman 1993).   13
5 Concluding  remarks 
The fast economic growth in transitional China has been achieved under the Chinese-
style development pattern of a dualistic economy. On the one hand, full mobilization of 
all the factors favourable for economic growth has generated three decades of rapid 
expansion. On the other hand, the advantage of an unlimited labour supply, which 
promoted the demographic dividend in the economy, has also become a major obstacle 
that has prevented the economy from transiting from an inputs-based to productivity-
based regime. Meanwhile, economic growth per se has been unable resolve the social 
problems emerging during the course of dual economy development. As the result of 
demographic transition, China’s economic development is now reaching its Lewisian 
turning point and will witness the disappearance of its unlimited supply of labour. Since 
the dualist economic structure constitutes not only a divide between traditional and 
modern economic sectors, but is also an element of labour market segregation, the 
approach of the turning point also necessitates urgent institutional changes; that is, 
opportunities will open for resolving a host of problems such as the imperfect rural 
labour force migration, income inequality and poverty, and inadequate guarantee of the 
rights of workers. It is critical that the Chinese government fully understands the 
changing nature of development stage. The government will need to conform to the 
conditions introduced by the turning point in order to adjust its policy orientation and to 
resolve its long-standing problems in economic development so that economic growth 
and harmony within the society can be maintained. 
Reference 
Anderson, K. (1995). ‘Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and 
Poor Countries’. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 43 (2): 401-23. 
Banister, J. (2005). ‘Manufacturing Earnings and Compensation in China’. Monthly 
Labour Review, August. 
Batra, A., and Z. Khan (2005). ‘Revealed Comparative Advantage: An Analysis for 
India and China’. Working Paper 168 (August). New Delhi: Indian Council for 
Research on International Economic Relations. 
Bhagwati, J. N. (1996). ‘The Miracle that Did Happen: Understanding East Asia in 
Comparative Perspective’. Paper presented at the conference on Government and 
Market: The Relevance of the Taiwanese Performance to Development Theory and 
Policy, 3 May. Ithaca: Cornell University. 
Cai, F. (2006a). Scientific Development Philosophy and Sustainability of Economic 
Growth. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China).  
Cai, F. (2006b). ‘Rowing Downstream: China’s Adjustment of Growth Pattern against 
the Imbalanced Global Economy’. Economic Perspective, 11: 11-15. 
Cai, F. (2006c). ‘Choosing a Growth Pattern that Suits the Present Development Stage’. 
China Economist, 3 (July): 80-8. 
Cai, F. (2007). ‘How Can China Maintain Its Competitiveness under Circumstance of 
Rising Labour Cost?’. In (ed.) F. Cai, Reports on China's Population and Labor,  
No. 8. Beijing: Academic Press (China).   14
Cai, F., and D. Wang (1999). ‘The Sustainability of Economic Growth and the Labour 
Contribution’. Economic Research Journal (Jingji yanjiu), 10: 62-8 (in Chinese). 
Cai, F., and D. Wang (2005). ‘China’s Demographic Transition: Implications for 
Growth’. In R. Garnaut and S. Ligang (eds), The China Boom and Its Discontents. 
Canberra: Asia Pacific Press. 
Cai, F., and M. Wang (2006). ‘Challenge Facing China’s Economic Growth in its Aging 
but not Affluent Era’. China & World Economy, 14 (5): 23-31. 
Cai, F., Y. Du, and M. Wang (2003). The Political Economy of Labour Mobility. 
Shanghai: Shanghai Sanlian Shudian and Shanghai People’s Publishing House.  
Fields, G. (2004). ‘Dualism in the Labour Market: A Perspective on the Lewis Model 
after Half a Century’. The Manchester School, 72 (6): 724-35. 
Freeman, R. (1993). ‘Labour Markets and Institutions in Economic Development’. AEA 
Papers and Proceedings, 83 (2): 403-8. 
Guo, Y. (2006). ‘Wu Jinglian’s Talk: the Imbalance of the Chinese Economy is Rooted 
in its Growth Pattern’. China Youth Newspaper, 24 July.  
Kalecki, M. (1976). Essays on Developing Economies. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press. 
Krugman, P. (1994). ‘The Myth of Asia’s Miracle’. Foreign Affairs, 
November/December. 
Krugman, P. (2006). ‘Wages, Wealth and Politics’. New York Times, 18 August. 
Kuiijs, L., and T. Wang (2005). ‘China’s Pattern of Growth: Moving to Sustainability 
and Reducing Inequality’. WB Research Working Paper 3767. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
Kuznets, S. (1955). ‘Economic Growth and Income Inequality’. American Economic 
Review, 45 (1): 1-28. 
Kuznets, S. (1973). ‘Modern Economic Growth: Findings and Reflections’. The 
American Economic Review, 63 (3): 247-58. 
Lewis, W. A. (1954). ‘Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour’. The 
Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies 22: 139-91. Reprinted (1958) in 
A. N. Agarwala and S. P. Singh (eds), The Economics of Underdevelopment. 
Bombay: Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, W. A. (1958). ‘Unlimited Labour: Further Notes’. The Manchester School of 
Economics and Social Studies, 26 (1): 1-32.  
NBS (National Bureau of Statistics) (2005). China Statistical Yearbook 2005. Beijing: 
China Statistics Press.  
Institute of Population and Labour Economics (2001 and 2005). China Urban Labour 
Surveys, 2001 and 2005. Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.  
Olson, M. (1985). ‘The Exploitation and Subsidization of Agriculture in the Developing 
and Developed Countries’. Paper presented to the 19th conference of International 
Association of Agricultural Economists. Malaga.   15
People’s Daily Online (2005). ‘Twenty Years of Stagnation of Migrant Wage: How Li 
Deshui Unscramble the Economic Causes of Migrant Labour?’ Available at: 
www//politics.people.com.cn/GB/1027/3149315.html. 
Perkins, D. (2005). ‘China’s Economic Growth in Historical and International 
Perspective’.  Jingjixue  (Jikan), 4 (4): 891-912 (China Economic Quarterly) (in 
Chinese). 
Ranis, G. (2004). ‘Arthur Lewis’ Contribution to Development Thinking and Policy’ 
Working Paper 891. New Haven: Economic Growth Center, Yale University. 
Roach, S. (2006). ‘China’s Rebalancing Imperatives: A Giant Step for Globalization’. 
Morgan Stanley Research, 1 December. Beijing: Morgan Stanley and 
Co. Incorporated. 
Rostow, W. W. (1960). The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rostow, W. W. (ed.) (1963). Economics of Take-off into Sustained Growth. New York: 
Macmillan and St. Marin Ltd. 
Rural Economic and Social Survey Team (2005). ‘The Continuing Increase of Rural 
Labour Migration in 2004’. Available at: www.sannong.gov.cn/qwfb/ncjj/ 
200503300220.htm. 
Sachs, J. D. (2004). ‘Stages of Economic Development’. Paper presented at the Chinese 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 19 June. Beijing. Available at: 
www.earth.columbia.edu/about/director/documents/china_speech061904.pdf. 
Skousen, M. (1993). Economics on Trial: Lies, Myths, and Realities. Chicago: Irwin 
Professional Publishing. 
Solow, R. M. (1956). ‘A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth’. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 70 (1): 65-94. 
Todaro, M. (1969). ‘A Model of Labour Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less 
Developed Countries’. American Economic Review, March: 138-48. 
United Nations (2005). World Population Prospects: the 2004 Revision. New York: 
United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
Watanabe, S. (1994). ‘The Lewisian Turning Point and International Migration: The 
Case of Japan’. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 3 (1): 119-47. 
Williamson, J. (1997). ‘Growth, Distribution and Demography: Some Lessons from 
History’ NBER Working Paper Series 6244. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research.    
World Bank (1993). The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. 
New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank. 
World Bank (1997). China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Wu, Y. (2003). ‘Has Productivity Contributed to China’s Growth?’. Pacific Economic 
Review, 8 (1): 15-30.   16
Young, A. (1992). ‘A Tale of Two Cities: Factor Accumulation and Technical Change 
in Hong Kong and Singapore’. In O. Blanchard and S. Fischer (eds), NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Yue, C. (2001). ‘Comparative Advantage, Exchange Rate and Exports in China’. Paper 
prepared for the international conference on Chinese economy captioned Has China 
Become a Market Economy?, 17-18 May. Clermont-Ferrand. 
Zheng, J., and A. Hu (2004). ‘An Empirical Analysis on Inter-provincial Productivity 
Growth during the Reform Period’. Working Paper  1. Beijing: Center for China 
Situation Studies. 
 